THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE by DONALD L. PEVSNER

THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE

DONALD L. PEVSNER

On June 26, 1988, a newly-delivered Air France Airbus A320 aircraft (F-GFKC) approached Mulhouse-Habsheim/MLH Airport, France, to perform a low level fly-by as part of an air show. The aircraft did not maintain sufficient airspeed, and descended through 100 feet (30m) to 30 feet (10m) above the runway. Then, it struck trees near the end of the runway and crashed into the adjacent forest. Three passengers of the 130 passengers and crew on board were killed. The final results under French criminal law were dramatic: the Captain, his First Officer, two Air France officials and the President of the flying club were all charged with involuntary manslaughter. All were found guilty, with the Captain being sentenced to 6 months in prison plus 12 months' probation; the others were sentenced to probation. (The crew disputed the proper functioning of both the altimeter and the throttles, to little avail in the official accident report.)

On the day of the crash, the Head of the Minister of Transport’s Cabinet was Jean-Cyril Spinetta.

On January 20, 1992, an Air Inter Airbus A320 aircraft (F-GGED) was descending toward Strasbourg-Entzheim/SXB Airport after a routine flight from Lyon/LYS. The crew improperly configured a poorly-designed Flight Control Unit (FCU), resulting in an overly-steep descent through cloud cover. As the aircraft was not equipped with a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), there was no automatic warning of the error. The aircraft struck a mountain, killing 87 of the 96 passengers and crew. More than fourteen years later, six French aviation officials (including top Air France and AIRBUS executives) were charged with involuntary manslaughter as a result of the crash. Their trial began on July 31, 2006.

On the day of the crash, the Chairman and CEO of Air Inter was Jean-Cyril Spinetta.

Thus were sown the seeds that led directly to the premature retirement of Concorde, at least a decade before this would have been technically necessary, on October 24, 2003. The saga of the secret betrayal of Concorde by top executives at both Air France (AF) and British Airways (BA), and the secret collusion between the Chairman of Air France and the President of AIRBUS to ensure that AF would not have to suffer the "loss of face" that would ensue from its unilaterally retiring its Concorde fleet, thereby leaving BA with a monopoly on supersonic transatlantic passenger service, is a sordid litany of hypocrisy, cowardice and "corporate politics." It is long overdue, as we approach the fifth anniversary of Concorde's premature retirement, that the facts be revealed.

Jean-Cyril Spinetta is a top-level French government bureaucrat from the prestigious Ecole Nationale d'Administration. Born in 1943, he served in several French government Ministries before becoming Head of the Minister of Transport’s Cabinet from 1988-1990. In 1990, he was named Chairman and CEO of Air Inter, the government-owned French domestic airline that was merged into Air France in 1997, and ran it until 1993. After serving as a personal adviser to the French President, in the European Commission and in several more Ministries, his big break arrived in September, 1997, when he was named Chairman and CEO of Air France. He remains in this top position today as Chairman and CEO of Air France/KLM Group.

As an aviation enthusiast since I saw the first BOAC Comet 4 aircraft leave Idlewild Airport/IDL, New York for London/LHR, on October 4, 1958, I decided to begin chartering Concorde in 1985. My first charter, from Miami/MIA to Aruba/AUA and return on November 16-17, 1985, with BA Concorde G-BOAG, was such a consummate thrill that I later proceeded to operate two all-supersonic Around-The-World luxury Concorde tours with G-BOAF, in 1989 and 1990. Numerous official International Aeronautical Federation (FAI) world air speed records were set by these 3 flights, all going to the pilots (as they should do), but an Around-The-World record remained a tantalizing prize. Then, after months of discussions, AF Chairman and CEO Bernard Attali gave his personal approval for AF to operate a Concorde world record flight Westbound Around-The-World, to commemorate the 500th anniversary of Columbus' first New World landing on October 12,1492. Ironically, this was the suggestion of a top BA Marketing executive, as BA refused to charter me one of its Concordes for this purpose, citing "potential embarrassment" should a mechanical delay occur en route. AF Concorde F-BTSD performed flawlessly on this epic flight, with six refueling stops, from October 12-13, 1992. I named the flight "SUNCHASER ONE", as the sun literally never set on the entire 32 hour 49 minute 3 second journey from Lisbon/LIS back to Lisbon/LIS. M. Attali stood smiling on the Lisbon/LIS ramp to welcome us back with the new world record.

On August 15-16, 1995, again with M. Attali's total support and encouragement, the same AF Concorde beat her own Westbound record by flying the companion Eastbound Around-The World journey in just 31 hours 27 minutes 49 seconds. This record remains THE GUINNESS BOOK OF RECORDS entry for the fastest circumnavigation of the Earth (not counting astronaut Tom Stafford's APOLLO X spacecraft record), and it will last for decades in the absence of a worthy successor to Concorde.

For details on both of these two landmark Concorde achievements, please see the website:

http://www.concorde-spirit-tours.com

By the time of my next AF Concorde charter, an all-supersonic circumnavigation of South America (plus a side-trip to Easter Island/IPC) with F-BTSD from January 8-27, 1999, I discovered to my amazement that the creative enthusiasm of former AF Chairman Bernard Attali had been replaced with a stern edict from new Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta:

"NO SPEED RECORDS"

"NO AIR SHOWS"

The flight was a total success, with 125,000 spectators at what turned out to be the only visit of Concorde to San Jose/SJO, Costa Rica, plus thousands more at the first of only two Concorde visits to Ushuaia/USH, Argentina. And official FAI world air speed records were filed behind M. Spinetta's back, with no notice to the world aviation press. They stand today, as a defiant AF Concorde Operations protest against M. Spinetta's air-crash paranoia.

Next, I signed a contract with AF for what would have been a spectacular "Millennium" flight on December 31, 1999. Named "MILLENNIUM IV", we would have greeted the Year 2000 four times at midnight, local time, at Paris/CDG; Gander/YQX; Vancouver/YVR and Kona/KOA, Hawaii. Indeed, a "MILLENNIUM VI" flight was theoretically possible, had we chosen to seek authority to operate from Sapporo/CTS, Japan and Novosibersk/OVB, Russia, as well as secure a Mach 2 track to overfly Russia. Well-known Japanese intransigence (only two AF Presidential Concordes had ever been allowed to land there, both of which were also allowed to overfly Russia at Mach 2) eliminated this option.

Then, out of the blue, I got a call from the AF Legal Department, informing me that M. Spinetta had personally ordered that my contract be breached by canceling it. As the contractual "boilerplate" contained cancellation loopholes broad enough to enable an AF Boeing 747-400 to taxi through them, I was left with an apology and with the bitter disappointment that, once again, M. Spinetta had chosen to deny aviation history the presence of a signal Concorde event.

On June 14, 2000, AF approved my request to charter Concorde for a spectacular flight through a total solar eclipse, from Ascension Island to the West African coastline near Luanda, Angola. No other airplane (including a BA Concorde) had ever been inside a total eclipse for more than about 7 minutes, but we would be able to do this for over one full hour. Our Captain was to be a dedicated French astronomy buff, assisted in the cockpit by a leading US astronomer. I flew from Paris/CDG to New York/JFK by AF Concorde the next day, with one of my best friends, AF Concorde First Officer Jean Marcot, at the controls. Jean had flown Concorde for over ten years, refusing several promotions to Captain on subsonic aircraft so that he could continue flying his beloved SST. He was also the only AF Concorde pilot to have flown aboard both of my Around-The-World record flights. 40 days later, on July 25, 2000, Jean was killed in the Gonesse, France crash of AF Concorde F-BTSC, while doing his utmost to save the airplane in what was, tragically, an unsurvivable accident. I shall never forget the last time I saw him, taxiing up to the jetway at JFK while pointing-out to me the magnificent full-length reflection of our Concorde in the Terminal 4 glass wall, with a beaming and proud smile on his face: the diametric opposite of a corporate "bean counter." Jean's funeral packed Besancon Cathedral, France. Requiescat in pace, mon ami.

The story of Concorde's grounding on July 25 (AF) and August 16 (BA), 2000, and the restoration of scheduled (but not charter) passenger flights on November 7, 2001, is far too long to relate here. Details may be found on the website: http://www.concordesst.com. However, given M. Spinetta's painful prior exposure to the Air France and Air Inter A320 crashes of 1988 and 1992, it is highly probable that he would have personally made the decision to immediately retire the AF Concorde fleet following the 2000 Gonesse crash, rather than invest the 25 million Euro (GBP 18,750,000/USD 37,500,000) cost of the safety modifications required for her to re-enter service, were this decision truly up to him alone. But, as Concorde was such an indelible symbol of the ultimate in world commercial aviation in both France and the U.K., and as the French government controlled AF, it is highly likely that both he and any politicians supporting such a decision would have been pilloried in the French press and forced by public outcry to resign in disgrace. Yet, with the trauma of a third fatal crash (this time with an ultra-high-profile AF Concorde, just a few miles from his office) wrecking M. Spinetta's peace-of-mind, the stage was now set for the premature removal of Concorde from the world aviation scene.

In November, 2002, a French reporter privately told a retired BA executive that there were strong rumors circulating in France that AF planned to retire Concorde "very soon." No word of such French defeatism had reached BA officially, but those very few BA insiders who learned of it began waiting for the other shoe to drop.

Then, on February 19, 2003, AF Concorde F-BTSD was operating the scheduled Paris/CDG-New York/JFK service when a fuel leak was noticed in engine # 3. When the crew shut down this engine, it negligently did not also turn off the valve controlling fuel flow to it. After suddenly noticing an alarming drop in the remaining fuel, the Captain diverted to Halifax/YHZ for an emergency landing. I was later told that there was not enough fuel on board to even do a go-around at YHZ, and that the aircraft landed "on the fumes."

Just 8 days later, on February 27, 2003, AF Concorde F-BVFA lost part of its rudder during its climb to altitude between Paris/CDG and New York/JFK. The cause was moisture contamination of the rudder's composite material, causing loss of integrity to the structure from freezing and thawing. BA had previously encountered this problem 3 times, and had elected to replace all 7 rudders in its Concorde fleet while stepping-up hangar inspections of their external surfaces. Though the problem was not serious, as the shredding of the composite material stopped at the metal structure surrounding it and as the rudder was principally used only on the ground, these two incidents proved to be the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back" as to M. Spinetta. In brief, he almost certainly viewed the potential risk of his personal criminal liability under French law in the event of another Concorde crash as outweighing his continued support for this French (and British) national icon.

Air France was preparing to privatize itself at this time, and AIRBUS was similarly run by another elite French bureaucrat: an Ecole Polytechnique graduate and protege of French President Jacques Chirac named Noel Forgeard. M. Spinetta proceeded to hold a secret meeting with M. Forgeard, delivering the urgent plea that Concorde be retired as soon as possible, notwithstanding the facts that the 2000-2001 safety modifications, plus a clear set of future maintenance programs (called "Re-lifes") that would ensure the long-term, safe operation of Concorde, were already in place and had the full confidence of both the French (DGAC) and British (CAA) civil aviation authorities.

AIRBUS, in turn, had its plate full with development of the massive A380 aircraft, and with production of other subsonic jets. Thus, M. Forgeard was not happy about continuing to assign AIRBUS personnel to the technical support of just 12 Concordes in the fleets of AF and BA, which would never be augmented by further orders. He would be more than receptive to M. Spinetta's entreaties.

At this point, it is essential to examine what was going on inside British Airways, where total support of Concorde was also required in order to keep her flying.

BA's President in 2003 was Roderick (“Rod”) Eddington, who was more supportive of Concorde. Without his then-positive position, she would not have continued flying at BA after the 2000 Gonesse crash. However, where there had been strong supporters of the BA Concorde in key departments in prior years and through several prior financial crises, who always put themselves and their jobs on the line on Concorde's behalf, this was manifestly not the case when the crunch arrived after Concorde’s post-crash return to service on November 7, 2001:

(1)Director of Engineering Alan MacDonald was perennially upset because the high cost of Concorde maintenance put a disproportionately-high dent in his overall budget, while he "never saw the profits." Thus, in early 2000, he recommended an end to all Concorde charters (which had provided about 10% of total BA Concorde revenues, plus incalculable international prestige for BA). He further alleged that future Concorde major maintenance checks would result in the necessity to have two BA Concordes in the hangar together, on an overlapping schedule basis, thereby reducing the available operational fleet to just 5 Concordes. Of course, there had been no reduction of BA's 6/7-strong operational Concorde fleet in more than two decades. The net result of this astonishing and negative position, caused by the fact that Mr. MacDonald simply did not wish to spend a sufficient sum on Concorde Engineering manpower to enable at least 6 of BA's 7 Concordes to be available for service on any given day, was BA's discontinuance of its high-demand morning service from London/LHR to New York/JFK, as well as its afternoon service from New York/JFK to London/LHR. Indeed, BA Concordes G-BOAA and G-BOAB never received their safety modifications and became derelict at LHR, with G-BOAA being stripped of parts to maintain BA's 5 operational Concordes. Suddenly, BA's fixed Concorde costs were only compensable from revenues produced by 6-7 weekly round-trip flights between London/LHR and New York/JFK. And BA President Rod Eddington, who had given Mr. MacDonald his job, inexplicably decided not to challenge the latter's destructive assertions concerning "Engineering limitations on serviceable Concorde availability."

(2)Irresponsible and unsupported arguments were then made by Air France, which circulated the lying allegation that "Concorde is 27 years old, and should be retired solely because she is an 'old airplane' and 'it's time'." This is utter nonsense, as any aeronautical engineer worth his or her salt will tell you that aircraft can be kept flying indefinitely when given appropriate maintenance. Just look at the Boeing B-52 bomber, which has been flying for 52 years, and the McDonnell Douglas DC-8-60/70 Series, which has been flying for 42 years, as only two relevant examples. Plus, the highest-time BA Concorde (G-BOAD) retired with just 23,397 total hours: about the same as a 5-year-old Boeing 747-400. The highest-time AF Concorde (F-BVFA) retired with just 17,824 total hours: about the same as a 4-year-old Boeing 747-400. So much for French veracity.

Unhappily, BA's Director of Safety and Security Geoff Want--an engineer himself-- refused to properly discredit these French lies to BA President Rod Eddington, thus helping them to take root at the highest levels inside the BA executive suite.

(3)BA had a Marketing contingency plan in effect since 1988, to counter any reduction in demand for high-priced Concorde tickets among its traditional top business executive clientele...as occurred during a cyclic downturn in the US and UK economies in Spring, 2000; after the July 25, 2000 Gonesse crash; and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center and the subsequent start of the Iraq war. Essentially, the 40-seat front cabin would have been turned into an ultra-premium Concorde service class for the fat-cats, at a higher fare that few of them would have refused to pay, with such amenities as limousine service at both New York and London and a plethora of other deluxe perks. The 60-seat rear cabin could have been fitted with more seats (Concorde was certificated for 128 passengers), at a pitch of less than 38 inches but still quite comfortable, to be sold at still-high Business Class prices. Or, the rear cabin seating could have been left as-is and would have also produced very high load factors and handsome revenue for BA at Business Class prices. Adopting this approach at both BA and AF would have probably solved the situation of future flying at less than break-even cost for both airlines, including reserves for progressive maintenance, as their Concordes would have probably been flying nearly-full all the time.

Further, the average price of jet fuel rose from 78 cents per gallon in January, 2000 to USD 2.75 per gallon in February, 2008. However, this increase would not have had the slightest effect on demand for Concorde seats. Concorde burned an average of 6,985 US gallons of fuel per hour on a transatlantic crossing. Given a block time of 3 hours 45 minutes from New York/JFK to either London/LHR or Paris/CDG, this translates to 26,194 US gallons of jet fuel per flight. Adding USD 1.97 per gallon produces an extra fuel cost of USD 51,602/GBP 25,801. When you divide this figure by an assumed average of 80 Concorde passengers per flight, the applicable fuel surcharge that would totally negate the fuel cost increase for AF and BA would be just USD 645/GBP 322.50 per passenger. This relatively-minor sum would not have deterred any prospective Concorde passenger for an instant.

But the key decision makers at BA (President Rod Eddington and Director of Operations Mike Street) refused to support this excellent contingency plan, thus putting a decisive nail in Concorde’s coffin on the BA side.

Now back to the Spinetta/Forgeard collusion. There is no question that the top executives at AF knew of the defeatist influence of Alan MacDonald's Engineering Department on BA's available Concorde utilization, as the AF and BA Concorde Operations Departments communicated regularly. As AIRBUS could not just walk away from the technical support function of both airlines' Concorde fleets without breaching key contracts with BA, an intrigue worthy of the Borgias was implemented. AIRBUS President Noel Forgeard suddenly announced that a new extra cost of technical support over the subsequent 5-year period would be GBP 8 million (USD 16 million) per year, for a total of GBP 40 million (USD 80 million), for both AF and BA combined. However, as AF was going to swiftly retire its own Concorde fleet, this entire extra cost would then fall on BA's shoulders alone. As BA was down to just 6-7 weekly round-trip London/LHR-New York/JFK flights, the increased AIRBUS technical-support bill (over and above its prior charges) effectively removed the possibility that such reduced service would ever produce more than a break-even financial result. Of course, had BA returned to a twice-daily scheduled service under its 1988 Marketing contingency plan, plus operated profitable charters again, the increased AIRBUS charges would not have mattered at all: as recently as the late 1990's, BA Concorde operations were producing an annual profit of between GBP 30-50 million (USD 60 million-100 million). Further, the resumption of charters would have removed any trepidations about flying Concorde that may have lingered among the "macho" top business executives who patronized scheduled Concorde service; i.e., "If a honeymoon couple is not worried about taking a Concorde charter around the Bay of Biscay, why should I be worried about taking a transatlantic Concorde flight?"

As for AF, though very little (if any) profit would have been made on its limited scheduled service, the adoption of BA's 1988 Marketing contingency plan on its own flight would probably have produced at least a break-even operation, thus preserving the "halo effect" of flying Concorde that benefited the entire airline's world image and uniquely satisfied its top customers. After all, AF routinely dumped Concorde seats on the European market outside France at Business Class prices anyway. Resuming charters would have also helped the AF bottom-line.

Here is what happened next:

(1)On April 10, 2003, AF and BA press releases announced that both airlines would retire Concorde later that year. AF's last scheduled passenger flight would be on May 31, 2003 (M. Spinetta was in a great hurry), and BA's last scheduled passenger flight would be on October 24, 2003. After that, both airlines' entire Concorde fleets would be loaned (BA) or given (AF) to aviation museums, or put on display at airports on the same basis. SEE Paragraph (10) for the real reason behind the difference in ownership status.

(2)BA President Rod Eddington had spent GBP 2 million (USD 4 million) on new interiors for each of its 5 operational Concordes, or GBP 10 million (USD 20 million) total, during the safety-modification grounding of 2000-2001. He received a nasty lesson in "French business ethics as the ultimate oxymoron" when AIRBUS presented its GBP 40 million extra technical-support bill...meaning that all those elegant new interiors had been an eight-figure waste of BA's money. The same applied to the approximately GBP 20 million (USD 40 million) that BA had spent on the "Re-life 1" maintenance program for the 5 of its 7 Concordes that needed it, which would have enabled them to fly until 2008 upon reaching 8,500 supersonic cycles. An additional cost of about GBP 36 million (USD 72 million) would have taken BA’s entire fleet of 7 Concordes to 10,000 supersonic cycles under “Re-life 2”, and would have extended its service life from 2008 to 2013. After that, a "Re-life 3" program was envisioned. As AF had never implemented the initial "Re-life 1" to its own (pre-2000) 6-Concorde fleet, this is the reason why AF had previously announced that it planned to retire its Concorde fleet in 2007. But the Gonesse, Halifax and CDG-JFK (rudder) incidents induced M. Spinetta to accelerate AF's Concorde retirement to May 31, 2003 instead.

(3)BA wrote off GBP 84 million (USD 168 million) in Concorde retirement expenses.

(4)AF wrote off USD 65 million (GBP 32.5 million/EUR 43,333,334) in Concorde retirement expenses.

(5)While AF rushed to get its Concordes out of the skies to keep M. Spinetta happy, BA packed its planes with "supersonic tourists" over the next 6 months, and realized about GBP 92 million (USD 184 million) in revenue as nearly every flight departed with all 100 seats filled with paying passengers.

(6)AIRBUS' Noel Forgeard refused to continue technical support of Concorde after October 31, 2003, thereby ensuring that both the UK CAA and French DGAC would reclaim and cancel Concorde's Certificates of Airworthiness immediately thereafter. M. Forgeard even refused to maintain the minimum technical-support function that would have kept a single BA Concorde flying in the UK on special occasions, which most of the British public wanted, thus reportedly infuriating BA President Rod Eddington.

(7)AF auctioned-off its entire inventory of Concorde spare parts on November 15, 2003, to ensure that these impossible-to-find necessities would be so dispersed as to irrevocably bar any future French Concorde flights. BA followed suit with two auctions, on December 1, 2003 and April 17, 2004, with the same intent: aimed partially at Virgin Atlantic CEO and entrepreneur Richard Branson, who had made several bids to buy and operate the BA Concorde fleet after the BA retirement announcement of April 10, 2003. (Mr. Branson and top BA management had been bitter enemies and rivals for years). However, an additional motive for BA to ensure that none of its Concordes ever flew again was a secret CY2003 contract with AIRBUS—discussed in Paragraph (10), below—that established BA President Rod Eddington as a near-equal of AF Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta in perfidy.

(8)Faithful Concorde enthusiasts in both London and Paris jammed key airport viewing areas to greet Concorde until the end...many with tears in their eyes and all totally unaware of the secret machinations by which they and Concorde had been utterly betrayed by Messrs. Spinetta and Forgeard, by French President Jacques Chirac (who, in my personal opinion, must have consented to the AIRBUS and AF anti-Concorde actions by two of his key appointees and proteges), and by several willing BA handmaidens from President Rod Eddington-down.

(9)It was revealed in CY2006 that BA President Rod Eddington ordered that the hydraulic fluid be drained from all of its 7 Concordes (still owned by BA), and their electrical systems disabled, to doubly-ensure that the cost to make a BA Concorde airworthy again would be prohibitive. [Early-production BA Concorde G-BBDG, used for flight-testing only, is also owned by BA but is not a candidate for future operation.] Captain W.D. (“Jock”) Lowe, former BA Chief Pilot and Chief Concorde Pilot, has rightly called this amazingly-destructive and self-serving CY2003 corporate decision “an act of vandalism.” As a direct result, Captain Lowe estimated that it would take at least GBP 15 million (USD 30 million/EUR 20 million) to return a BA Concorde to airworthiness. In sharp contrast, volunteer former AF Concorde engineers are performing frequent routine maintenance on AF Concorde F-BTSD, at LeBourget Airport, Paris. The cost to restore that Around-The-World record-setting Concorde to airworthiness is a relatively-modest GBP 3 million (USD 6 million/EUR 4 million). It remains to be seen whether either British or French Concorde-restoration groups will be successful in eventually restoring this former AF Concorde to flight.

(10) Under current BA Chairman Martin Broughton and BA President Willie Walsh, all requests for relinquishments of title to BA Concordes, made by various pro-Concorde groups and aviation museums, have been summarily refused. The real reason for their uncompromising stance is this: a key source has just advised this writer that a secret contract was signed in CY2003 between BA and AIRBUS, in which BA abandoned planned legal action against AIRBUS for its unfair trading practice (under UK law) of imposing such a high charge for Concorde “product support.” The AIRBUS price increase, of course, was an integral part of its Machiavellian collusion with AF against BA, as described above. The quid pro quo for BA was a deep discount on a fleet of new AIRBUS A320 narrowbody aircraft that no other airline could negotiate. A key clause in the secret BA/AIRBUS contract reportedly mandates that BA retain ownership of all of its complete Concorde airframes, so that no one can ever fly them again…with heavy financial penalties should BA breach this provision. Thus did BA President Rod Eddington plunge the final knife into Concorde’s back, joining the poisonous dagger previously inserted there by AF Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta. In the end, the demise of the fastest, loveliest and most-exciting passenger aircraft ever built was directly caused by these two unsentimental and unscrupulous top executives. It is high time that their previously-hidden actions be disclosed to the light of day, so that the French, British and US citizenry, and indeed the entire world, knows whom to blame for Concorde’s grossly-premature retirement.

(9)EPILOGUE:

(a)Noel Forgeard joined AIRBUS in 1998, as the personal choice of French President Jacques Chirac. He was later elevated by President Chirac to the co-Chairmanship of EADS: parent of AIRBUS. In June, 2006, he was forced to resign in disgrace because of his involvement in an insider-trading scandal, in which he sold millions of dollars'-worth of his family's AIRBUS stock prior to several public announcements that serious delays in A380 production would cost AIRBUS over 6 billion Euros (USD 9 billion/GBP 4.5 billion) over the succeeding 4-year period; and for mismanaging the A380 program while President of AIRBUS.

(b)Jean-Cyril Spinetta remains Chairman and CEO of a highly-profitable Air France/KLM Group. He has not been indicted for any past air crashes, but AF’s President and COO, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, is one of the six executives who stood trial in CY2006 in conjunction with the Air Inter A320 crash of January 20, 1992, when he ran the DGAC. He, and the other 5 defendants, was acquitted of criminal charges on November 7, 2006.

(c)Jacques Chirac’s term as President of France is now over. His "crocodile tears", shared with M. Spinetta and M. Forgeard at numerous AF Concorde retirement ceremonies in France, should not soon be forgotten. He left office loathed by a majority of the French people. His certain support of AF Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta’s secret conspiracy with AIRBUS should be added to a list of his other official misdeeds.

(d)Rod Eddington left BA on September 30, 2005, and now serves as CEO of Victorian Major Events, of Melbourne, Australia (his native country). His long-time presence as a Member of the Board of Directors of News Corporation—Rupert Murdoch’s worldwide media empire—ensures that none of the Murdoch-owned newspapers (including THE LONDON TIMES and THE WALL STREET JOURNAL) will be in any great hurry to report on the major news story revealed by this article.

(e)Alan MacDonald, Mike Street and Geoff Want have retired from BA. The former, in particular, is anathema to a long list of former BA flight crew and operations personnel.

No longer can we cross the North Atlantic Ocean in 3 hours 23 minutes at 56,000 feet; nor experience that mighty jet-fighter blast down the runway at takeoff; nor climb at up to 12,000 feet per minute on special occasions (which I did out of Lisbon/LIS for Paris/CDG the day after we captured the Westbound Around-The World speed record); nor revel in the ultimate mode of high-speed luxury transportation. Instead, the actions of those persons described above have resulted in the first backward step in aviation since the Wright Brothers first flew, on December 17, 1903. Let us hope that the next supersonic passenger aircraft receives far more loyalty from those airline and aerospace executives at the top, and from key politicians, than did Concorde nearly five years ago, as the final knives were plunged into her elegant back.

*This article is dedicated to the memory of Air France First Officer Jean Marcot:

AIRMAN

FRIEND

(1950-2000)

*DONALD L. PEVSNER is an aviation lawyer, consumer advocate, former syndicated newspaper columnist and tour operator. He lives in North Carolina, USA. And he misses Concorde every day."

*This article is current as of February 29, 2008.